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THE MARITIME BOUNDARIES OF THE STATES 
Avrum M. Gross* 
IT has long been recognized that the boundaries of coastal states encompass certain adjoining maritime areas. The settled exist-
ence of those boundaries, however, stands in marked contrast to the 
confusion which has surrounded their location. The geographic 
extent of the waters to which state jurisdiction extends has remained 
largely undetermined. 
The recent development of refined methods for extracting min-
erals from offshore areas has translated questions of state jurisdiction 
into issues of substantial economic significance. In this regard, an 
increasing number of disputes have arisen between the states and 
the federal government, primarily over rights to offshore oil depos-
its. The litigation which has resulted• from these disputes, while 
limited to particular aspects of boundary delineation, has inferen-
tially established a framework of general application.1 It is the pur-
pose of this article, through analysis of this series of judicial decisions 
and their historical background, to translate that inferential frame-
work into concrete principles of definition. 
!. THE FUNDAMENTALS FOR ANALYSIS 
The navigable waters of the globe are divisible into three basic 
categories-inland waters, marginal seas, and high seas. Since high 
seas are by definition those waters outside the general jurisdiction 
of any sovereign, a discussion of maritime boundaries, of necessity, 
focuses on the two remaining classifications. 
The marginal or territorial sea is a band of waters abutting the 
coast of a nation over which that nation exercises exclusive juris-
diction, except for the right of innocent passage afforded to foreign 
vessels.2 The outer limit of the marginal sea is by definition the sea-
ward boundary of the nation.3 
The inland waters of a nation are waters landward of its marginal 
• Member of the Alaska Bar.-Ed. 
1. See United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965); United States v. Florida, 
363 U.S. 121 (1960); United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960); United States v. 
Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United 
States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); United States v. Alaska, 236 F. Supp. 388 
(D. Alaska 1964). 
2. 1 SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES 23 (1962). See generally JESSUP, TERRI-
TORIAL WATERS AND MAru.TIME JURISDICTION (1927). 
3. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 33 (1947); Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 
262 U.S. 100, 122-23 (1923); l MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 145, at 704 (1906); 
1 WHARTON, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 32, at 107 (1886). 
[ 639] 
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sea, as well as waters within its land territory. Waters landward of 
the marginal sea, in turn, are those waters above the mean low water 
line of the sea, and waters landward of the seaward limits of ports, 
rivers, bays and harbors.4 To ascertain, in bays or other coastal in-
dentations, the division between inland and territorial waters, a 
straight line, called a "baseline," is drawn from headland to head-
land across the mouth of the indentation or at some place within it. 
All waters landward of the line are inland; the marginal sea is 
measured seaward from the baseline. 5 
The distinction between inland waters and the marginal sea 
is of obvious significance where national interests are involved. 
However, this demarcation is no less significant in determining state 
boundaries, since state jurisdiction over the water areas is derived 
from different sources, with a resultant divergence in character 
depending upon which type of water area is involved. 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the individual 
states have ownership of all lands beneath inland waters within their 
respective boundaries, and exclusive jurisdiction over the water areas 
themselves.6 The Court's analysis was initially premised on the 
theory that the original states succeeded to all the rights of the 
English Crown.7 Similar authority was conceded to states admitted 
after the Revolution, on the theory that those states entered the 
Union on an "equal footing" with their predecessors.8 
Before 1947 when the Court handed down its decision in United 
States v. California,9 it had been generally assumed that state 
authority over the marginal sea was identical to that possessed over 
inland waters.10 In the California case, however, the two maritime 
4. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TIIE SEA 158-60 (5th rev. ed. 1962): 
1 SHALowrrz, op. cit. supra note 2, app. A. 
5. I SHALowrrz, op. cit. supra note 2, at 281. 
6. Sec, e.g., Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935) (San Pedro Day); 
Port of Seattle v. Oregon & Wash. R.R., 255 U.S. 56 (1921) (Seattle Harbor); The 
Abby Dodge, 223 U.S. 166 (1912) (Gulf of Mexico and Straits of Florida); Manchester v. 
Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891) (Buzzards Bay): Weber v. Board of Harbor Comm'rs, 
85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57 (1873) (San Francisco Bay); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 
71 (1855) (Chesapeake Bay). 
7. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842). 
8. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). 
9. 332 U.S. 19 (1947). 
10. As the Court itself subsequently noted, the assumption was "not without 
reason." Sec United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. I, 16 (1960). In the California case 
the Court commented that in applying the doctrine of Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 
(3 How.) 212 (1845), it had "used language strong enough to indicate ••• that states 
not only· owned tidelands and soil under navigable inland waters, but also owned 
soils .under all navigable waters within their territorial jurisdiction, whether inland 
or not." 332 U.S. at 36. 
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areas were distinguished. In the Court's view, the marginal belt had 
been created purely as an attribute of federal sovereignty-an ex-
tension of jurisdiction for national, rather than local, purposes. 
Since this extension had occurred after the formation of the Union, 
the original states could not have derived rights in the marginal belt 
as an inherent attribute of their sovereignty.11 Subsequently ad-
mitted states which claimed pre-admission authority over the mar-
ginal belt were denied continuing author~ty, since the "equal foot-
ing" concept required relinquishment of sovereignty over the area 
to the federal government upon ~ntrance into the Union.12 
The controversy in the California case arose out of a dispute 
between the federal government and the state of California over 
proprietary rights to lands beneath the marginal sea. The holding, 
however, raised doubts whether state jurisdiction of any kind existed 
beyond the inland water mark. Concern over this point was dispelled 
by the Court's decision the following year m. Toomer v. Witsell,13 
which recognized the states' authority over marginal sea areas within 
their boundaries. The California holding was restricted to instances 
in which the "paramount" federal authority over the marginal belt 
conflicted with an exercise of state jurisdiction. Since no such con-
flict was evident in Toomer, the principle of the exercise of state 
police power over marginal seas was upheld, although the specific 
regulations in question were invalidated on constitutional grounds.14 
Federal authority over lands underlying the marginal sea was 
subsequently abrogated by the Submerged Lands Act.15 Section 
3(a)(l) grants to the states "title to and ownership of" all lands 
underlying "navigable" waters within their boundaries.16 "Bounda-
ries" include the boundaries possessed by a state at the time it 
entered the Union, or as subsequently approved by Congress, but 
in no event may such boundaries extend beyond three miles from 
the "coast line" in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, or beyond three 
leagues in the Gulf of fy{exico.17 The "coast line" is defined as the 
11. See 332 U.S. at 32-35. 
12. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 (1950); United States v. Louisiana, 339 
U.S. 699 (1950). 
13. 334 U .s. 385 (1948). 
14. See also Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 75 (1941), where state regulations over 
territorial waters were upheld "in the absence of conflicting federal legislation." 
15. 67 Stat. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1964). A general discussion of the Sub-
merged Lands Act and the companion Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 67 Stat. 
462 (1953), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1964), may be found in Wright, Jurisdiction in the 
Tidelands, 32 TUL. L. REv. 175 (1958). 
16. 67 Stat. 30 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(l) (1964). 
17. Submerged Lands Act § 2(b), 67 Stat. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 130l(b) (1964). 
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low water mark on the coast or the "seaward limit of inland waters. "18 
The significance of the Submerged Lands Act is not limited to 
the language of grant; section 4 of the act provides that states which 
had no defined maritime boundary when admitted to the Union 
may extend their boundaries to a point not to exceed three miles 
from the "coast line."19 The insertion of this provision was necessi-
tated by the fact that only a limited number of states possessed mari-
time boundaries which would have permitted them to claim the 
benefits of section 3(a). The original states all claimed inherent 
sovereignty over inland waters along the coast, but they made no 
claim of sovereignty beyond the inland water boundary.20 Subse-
quently admitted coastal states entered the Union with authority 
over inland waters equal to that of their predecessors, but only a 
limited number of the coastal states possessed maritime boundaries 
approved by Congress in their acts of admission.21 Therefore, in 
addition to the obvious importance of the Submerged Lands Act 
as a transfer of federal dominion to all of the coastal states, the act 
also stands as an overall congressional sanction' of the maritime 
boundaries of a substantial number of states. 
It is relevant to note here the absolute necessity of congressional 
approval for the establishment of a valid maritime boundary. It is 
true that a state's jurisdiction over its residents has been judicially 
recognized to extend beyond traditional boundary concepts, without 
reference to congressional action of any kind.22 Such recognition, 
however, stands merely as a concession to state authority over state 
residents wherever they are, and not as support for the proposition 
that state action is all that is necessary for the establishment of a 
18. Submerged Lands Act § 2(c), 67 Stat. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 130l(c) (1964). 
19. 67 Stat. 31 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1964). 
20. See United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 32-33 (1947). 
21. The acts of admission of Alabama (Act of March 2, 1819, 3 Stat. 490), Alaska 
(Act of July 7, 1958, 72 Stat. 339), Hawaii (Act of March 18, 1959, 73 Stat. 4), Louisiana 
(Act of April 8, 1812, 2 Stat. 702), Mississippi (Act of March 1, 1817, 3 Stat. 348), 
and Oregon (Act of February 14, 1859, 11 Stat. 383) make specific reference to maritime 
boundaries. The constitutions of the states of California (1849, art. XII), Florida (1868, 
art. 1), and Washington (1889, art. XXIV), which describe maritime boundaries, were 
all expressly or impliedly approved by Congress. See respectively: Act of September 9, 
1850, 9 Stat. 452; Act of June 25, 1868, 15 Stat. 73; Act of February 22, 1899, 25 Stat, 
676. Texas was admitted to the Union by the Annexation Resolution of Dec. 29, 
1845, 9 Stat. 108, wherein Congress consented that "the territory properly included 
within, and rightfully belonging to, the Republic of Texas, might be erected into a 
new State." The Republic of Texas, including a marine boundary in the Gulf of 
Mexico, was defined by the Texas Congress on December 19, 1836 (1 Laws, Republic 
of Texas 1193). 
22. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941). See also Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924) 
(assertion of federal jurisdiction over United States citizens outside country); United 
States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922) (same). 
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valid "boundary." On the contrary, the Supreme Court has clearly 
stated that the power to prescribe state boundaries lies exclusively 
with Congress, and, while that power may be exercised through 
approval of a state's delineation of its boundaries, it is the appr(?val, 
rather than the state action, that establishes the boundary.23 
The primary difficulty in maritime boundary delineation lies in 
the fact that neither the Submerged Lands Act nor any other source 
attempts to define clearly the areas circumscribed by these bound-
aries. Although a description of inland waters is necessary to a de-
termination of the boundaries of all coastal states, no such descrip-
tions are apparent from an analysis of colonial boundaries, and none 
is specified in any act of admission or in the Submerged Lands Act. 
Several statehood acts describe maritime boundaries in general 
terms, such as "appurtenant" territorial waters.24 The Submerged 
Lands Act25 and a few of the statehood acts26 provide a specific width 
for the marginal sea, but make no attempt to prescribe the manner 
in which the defined belt of waters is to be located in relation to the 
coast.27 A useful theory of boundary delineation, therefore, requires 
a clarification of terminology. The "marginal sea" and "inland 
waters" of the states must be defined in a manner which lends itself 
readily to geographic description. 
II. DELINEATION OF THE MARGINAL SEA OF THE STATES 
Determination of the extent of marginal-sea area included within 
a state boundary is the least complex aspect of the problem. The 
majority of states entered the Union with no defined maritime 
boundary in their acts of admission, 28 and thus derived their au-
thority over marginal-sea areas entirely as a result- of the congres-
sional grant in the Submerged Lands Act. In this regard, section 4 
of the act is specific in limiting the maximum breadth of the bound-
ary extension for these states to three miles from the coast line. In 
contrast, however, greater difficulties in determining the width of 
the marginal sea have developed with respect to those few states 
23. See note 38 infra. 
24. See, e.g., statebood acts of Alaska and Hawaii cited in note 21 supra. 
25. § 4, 67 Stat. 31 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1964). 
26. See statehood act of Oregon and constitutions of Florida, California, and 
Washington cited in note 21 supra. 
27. The difficult problem of determining the exact point on the coast from which 
to measure the marginal-sea belt is discussed in Part Ill infra. 
28. As noted above, see note 20 supra and accompanying text, the thirteen original 
states asserted no maritime claims outside of inland waters. In addition, neither the 
statebood act nor the original constitution of the state of Maine established any 
maritime boundary whatsoever. See Act of March 3, 1820, 3 Stat. 544. 
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which entered the Union with congressionally approved boundaries 
apparently in excess of three miles from the coast. Texas, Louisiana, 
Alabama, Mississippi and Florida all claimed such boundaries,20 but 
the United States Government has continually refused to recognize 
the validity of claims beyond three miles, on the theory that since 
the marginal sea of the nation is established at three miles from the 
coast, 30 state authority cannot extend beyond the three-mile limit. 
The claims of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama were all 
predicated on somewhat similar clauses in their acts of admission, 
which described Mississippi and Alabama as "including all islands 
within six leagues of the shore,"31 and described Louisiana as "in-
cluding all islands .within three leagues of the coast."82 The states 
contended that this reference to offshore islands implied that all 
waters between the islands and the mainland were included within 
the territory of the state. The Supreme Court rejected this inter-
pretation, holding that although the islands were part of the state, 
the only water areas similarly included were the various three-mile 
belts around the islands.33 The Court found no conflict between 
state and national policy in this regard, since, in its opinion, the acts 
of admission evinced no attempt by the United States to claim any 
more of the marginal sea than that sanctioned by national policy. 
In t\V'O cases involving Texas34 and Florida,85 however, a conflict 
between state and federal policy was squarely presented. Both states 
entered the Union with congressionally approved boundaries in the 
Gulf of Mexico three leagues from the shore.86 Congressional action 
in this regard was in direct contrast to the announced foreign policy 
of the State Department, which advocates a marginal sea of three 
miles for the United States and other countries.87 The Court's resolu-
29. See United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960); United States v. Louisiana, 
363 U.S. I (1960). 
30. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); Cunard S.S. Co, v. Mellon, 262 
U.S. 100, 122 (1922). The traditional position of the United States in support of the 
three-mile limit is reviewed in I MOORE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 145, at 705; I WHARTON, 
op. cit, supra note 3, § 32, at 107. 
31. Alabama: Act of March 2, 1819, 3 Stat. 490; Mississippi: Act of March I, 1817, 
3 Stat. 348. 
112. Act of April 8, 1812, 2 Stat. 702. 
33. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. I, 66-83 (1960). 
34. Id. at 36-65. See text accompanying note 122 infra. 
35. United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1960). 
36. See note 21 supra. 
37. The Court, in United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. I (1960), was careful to point 
out that the policy of the executive branch establishes a "boundary" for the nation 
only in a "special sense." The United States, like other nations, has traditionally 
exerted control over certain activities, such as smuggling, at varying distances from 
its coast. See Anti-Smuggling Act, 49 Stat. 517 (1935), as amended, 19 U.S,C. §§ 1701-11 
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tion of this apparent conflict was a recognition of the congressionally 
approved boundaries, with a further recognition of the inherent 
power of the executive branch to control the exercise of certain 
activities within the boundaries.88 
An example may clarify the foregoing result. The exercise of 
state control over fishing up to a boundary of three marine leagues 
is obviously inconsistent with the foreign policy of the nation, which 
recognizes United States jurisdiction only up to a boundary of three 
miles. Thus, although Texas and Florida have congressionally ap-
proved maritime boundaries three leagues from the coast, the foreign 
policy of the nation prohibits those states from exercising rights 
over fisheries outside of the traditional three-mile marginal belt. 
This curtailment does not affect the boundary itself, but only the 
rights which may be exercised within it, much as a federal treaty 
may curtail state police power over areas of land within state 
borders.89 
The limiting effect of foreign policy disappears when the bound-
ary question involves a matter of solely domestic concern. The Sub-
merged Lands Act is directed to just such a situation. Since the 
United States has already laid claim, as against all other nations, to 
all mineral resources underlying the continental shelf, 40 the division 
of those resources between the states and the federal governments 
is a purely domestic problem; whatever the division, the foreign 
policy of the nation will remain unaffected.41 Therefore, since in the 
(1964). See also 62 Stat. 799 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 2152 (1964) (defense purposes). While 
the three-mile limit may indicate the point at which these rights and others are 
concentrated, even the marginal sea is subject to rights of innocent passage by foreign 
vessels. Thus it can be seen that the authority which may be asserted to protect a 
maritime boundary is more limited than in the case of a boundary dividing the land 
areas of two sovereigns. 
38. "The power to admit new States resides in Congress. The President, on the 
other hand, is the constitutional representative of the United States in- its dealings 
with foreign _nations. From the former springs the power to establish state boundaries; 
from the latter comes the power to determine how far this country will claim terri-
torial rights in the marginal sea as against other nations." United States v. Louisiana, 
supra note 37, at 35. In a similar vein, the Court noted: "It may indeed be that the 
Executive, in the exercise of its power, can limit the enjoyment of certain incidents of 
a Congressionally conferred boundary, but it does not fix that boundary." Id. at 51. 
39. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 
U.S. 324 (1937); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
40. By Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1945), the United 
States asserted "jurisdiction and control" over "the national resources of the subsoil 
and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the 
coasts of the United States." 
41. "[I]n light of the purely domestic purposes of the Act, we see no irreconcilable 
conflict between the Executive policy relied on by the Government and the historical 
events claimed to have fixed seaward boundaries for some States in excess of three 
miles." United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 33 (1960). 
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Submerged Lands Act the states were granted all lands underlying 
navigable waters within their boundaries as previously approved by 
Congress, Texas and Florida were both free to exercise rights of 
ownership to the full extent of those boundaries, regardless of 
whether their rights might be limited as to other activities. 
Thus, it can be seen that the geographic breadth of the marginal 
sea is readily ascertainable. For all coastal states but two, the maxi-
mum extent of maritime areas which may be included within the 
boundary is a three-mile belt measured from the coast. In the two 
remaining states, the boundary is located three leagues seaward of 
the coast in the Gulf Stream, and three miles seaward at other lo-
cations. 
III. DELINEATION OF THE INLAND WATERS OF THE STATES 
The most difficult problem of boundary location is not in de-
termining the breadth of the marginal-sea belt, but rather its lo-
cation. There is general agreement that the marginal sea is measured 
from the low-water mark on the coast or from the seaward limit of 
inland waters.42 While determination of the low-water mark has 
caused only minor difficulty,43 the absence of any settled definition 
of "the seaward limit of inland waters" has created problems of the 
greatest magnitude. 
Prior to attempting a definition, it is necessary to review certain 
historical developments in the international law of the sea. Although 
marginal-sea areas have been described precisely by Congress, no 
specific domestic definition of inland waters is available. Fortunately, 
however, a definition of inland waters has evolved within the frame-
work of the law of nations; a meaningful analysis of the term must 
commence with a review of that evolution. 
A. Inland Waters as Defined by International Law 
Where the coastline of a nation is straight or subject to only 
slight curvature, generally accepted principles of international law 
require that the marginal-sea belt, whatever its width, follow the 
42. See authorities cited note 44 infra. 
43. Since there are two low tides each day on any particular coast, there had been 
some question as to whether the low-water mark was to be derived from the average 
of all low tides, or from averaging only the lower low tides. Article 3 of the Geneva 
Convention of the Law of the Sea uses "the low-water line along the coast as 
marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the Coastal State." Convention 
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, art. 3, T.I.A.S, No, 
5639. For the United States, the recognized charts are those of the United States 
Coast and Geodetic Survey, which adopt the lower low-water line. See United States 
v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 176 (1965). 
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sinuosities of the low-water mark on the coast.44 In areas where the 
coastline is sharply indented, however, the task of locating the mar-
ginal sea is more complex. In the case of harbors, bays, and estuaries, 
it has traditionally been conceded that the coastal nation may mea-
. sure the marginal sea from a line drawn across the mouth of the 
indentation or at some point within it. Waters landward of this _base-
line are internal waters of the coastal nation.45 
The establishment . of a precise formula for ascertaining the 
proper location and maximum length of a baseline within bays has 
created one of the more substantial and durable disputes among na-
tions. The earliest numerical formulation was the most obvious. 
Since three miles was the normally accepted width of a territorial 
sea, any opening up to six miles in width was already subject to con-
trol by a coastal nation surrounding the indentation; it was therefore 
argued that a baseline six miles in length was proper for separation 
of inland and territorial waters within bays.46 The six-mile limita-
tion, while reasonable in theory, never gained general acceptance 
as a rule of international law. Certain nations, for reasons of con-
venience, insisted that an opening of ten miles could validly be en-
closed by a baseline.47 Moreover, a leading group of international 
experts asserted that twelve miles would constitute a valid closing 
line.48 While seeking a precise definition of inland waters, nations 
were equally anxious to disregard any specific mathematical criterion 
when it suited their advantage to do so.49 
44. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los An-
geles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935); Letter from Secretary of State Bayard to Secretary of the 
Treasury Manning, May 28, 1886, 1 MooRE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 149, at 718-21. But 
see 1 KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 29-30 (1832), where the author advocates 
measurement of the marginal sea of the United States from straight lines drawn 
between distant headlands, "as for instance, from Cape Ann to Cape Cod." Kent's 
view is cited approvingly in The Kodiak, 53 Fed. 126 (D. Alaska 1892). 
45. Early writings suggest a disparity of view on this matter. Despagnet and Hall, 
whose views are reprinted in THE ExTENT OF THE MARGINAL SEA 53-58, 64-83 (Crocker 
ed. 1919), both apparently believed that a baseline in bays represented the outer limit 
of the marginal sea. This view was soon discarded. See JESSUP, op. cit. supra note 2, 
at 475. 
46. The six-mile rule has been referred to by the Supreme Court as "the minimum 
limit of the territorial jurisdiction of a nation over tide-waters." Manchester v. Massa-
chusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 258 (1891). See CoLOMBos, op. cit. supra note 4, at 162. 
47. The origin of the ten-mile figure has been traced to an 1893 treaty between 
England and France. Subsequent international compacts adopted this limitation, often 
verbatim. See CoLOMBOS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 162-63; writings of Bonfils, de Lapra-
delle, and Latour, reprinted in THE ExTENT OF THE MARGINAL SEA, op. cit. supra note 
45, at 11-13, 183-274. · 
48. See Scorr, REsoLUTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 114 (1916). 
49. See Direct United States Cable Co. v. Anglo-American Tel. Co., 2 App. Cas. 394 
(P.C. 1877) (Newfoundland) (Conception Bay); The Alleganean (Stetson v. United 
States); 4 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 4332 (1898) (2d Ct. of Comm'rs of Ala. 
Claims) (Chesapeake Bay); 1 OPS. ATT'Y GEN. 33 (1793) (Delaware Bay). 
648 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 64:639 
The first test of the existence of any established rule of interna-
tional law defining inland waters within bays arose in the North 
Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration.50 The dispute concerned the 
interpretation of an 1818 treaty between the United States and Great 
Britain which prohibited American fishermen from fishing within 
three nautical miles,of any "bays, creeks or harbors of His Britannic 
Majesty's dominions in America."51 The British Government con-
tended that the term "bays" referred to all indentations, regardless 
of the distance between headlands at their mouth. The United 
States argued that, under international law in force at the time of 
the treaty, "bays" meant only small indentations, and that the maxi-
mum length of a closing line between headlands in a bay was six 
miles. The arbitration tribunal rejected all subsequently accepted 
lines of a particular length as arising out of "international acts" and 
"relating to coasts of a different configuration and conditions of a 
different character."52 Instead, the tribunal couched its understand-
ing of applicable principles in general terms, holding that the three-
mile marginal-sea belt was "to be measured from a straight line 
drawn across the body of water at the place where it ceases to have 
the configuration and characteristics of a bay."58 
Although the tribunal refused to recognize any accepted rule of 
international law mathematically delimiting the size of bays, it was 
willing to concede that its general statement of principle was "not 
entirely satisfactory as to its practical applicability."64 Therefore, the 
tribunal suggested that both parties agree that, with certain excep-
tions, the baseline in bays should be dra·wn at the first point therein 
"where the width does not exceed ten miles."65 The result of the 
decision, therefore, was a rejection of the ten-mile rule as a principle 
of international law, and a concurrent adoption of that length as a 
matter of practicality. 
The holding of this arbitration tribunal, coupled with the sub-
sequent failure of the Hague Conference on the Law of the Sea to 
arrive at any significant agreement on the question of closing lines 
50. S. Doc. No. 870, 61st Cong .. 3d Sess. (1910-11). The Arbitration was held at 
The Hague in 1910. The most comprehensive analysis of the proceeding is found in 
JESSUP, op. cit. supra note 2, at 363-82. 
51. Convention with Great Britain, respecting fisheries, boundary, and the restora-
tion of slaves, art. I, Oct. 20, 1818, reprinted in THE Ex.TENT OF THE MARGINAL SEA, op. 
cit. supra note 45, at 646-47. See JESSUP, op. cit. supra note 2, at 365. 
52. Id. at 374. 
53. Id. at 377. 
54. Ibid. 
55. Ibid, 
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in bays,56 cast great doubt on the international applicability of the 
ten-mile rule. Moreover, the concept of a standard length for all 
baselines was rejected by the International Court of Justice in the 
Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway ).57 The issue before the 
court concerned the validity of Norway's claim that vast water areas 
abutting her coast were inland waters. Great Britain, faced with a 
possible loss of valuable fishing rights, argued that baselines drawn 
across fjords and bays were limited to a maximum length of ten 
miles. The court rejected the British argument, holding that: 
[A]lthough the ten-mile rule has been accepted by certain 
States both in their national law and in their treaties and con-
ventions, and although certain arbitral decisions have applied it 
as between these States, other States have adopted a different 
limit. Consequently, the ten-mile rule has not acquired the 
authority of a general rule of international law.58 
After rejecting the ten-mile baseline approach as a rule of law, 
the International Court upheld a Norwegian scheme of boundary 
measurement which exhibited a new and flexible approach toward 
the definition of inland waters. Norway's coastline is highly irregu-
lar and liberally sprinkled with nearby rock formations and islands. 
Instead of measuring its marginal-sea belt from the low-water mark 
on the coast, Norway established a straight baseline system circum-
scribing the outer fringe of the so-called Skeerkagaard, or island 
fringe. For ·this purpose, a line was drawn from the mainland to the 
outer limit of the island fringe and thence from island to island 
until eventually it returned to the mainland. Waters landward of 
the line were claimed as inland, and the marginal belt was extended 
seaward from this artificial "coast." It is interesting to note that this 
baseline utilized by Norway occasionally reached sixty miles or 
more in length bet1\Teen points of land. Nevertheless, in the coUl't's 
view a claim to inland waters was to be tested by reference to three 
basic criteria: 
56. The 1930 Hague Conference was called to consider the codification of various 
branches of international law, including the law of the sea. See REsEARcH IN INTER• 
NATIONAL LAW, DRAFT CONVENTIONS AND COMMENTS ON NATIONALITY, RllsPONSIBILlTY OF 
STATES FOR INJURIES TO AuENs, AND TERRITORIAL WATERS 243-45 (1929), as reprinted in 
23 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. (1929). Neither the draft nor any substitute convention was 
adopted at the conference. United States proposals in regard to bays, together with 
French proposals on the same subject, are reprinted in 3 ACTS OF THE CONFERENCE FOR 
THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL l.Aw 195-97 (League of Nations Pub. No. 1930, v. 
16). 
57. (1951] I.C.J. Rep. 116. 
58. Id. at 131. 
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1. the close dependence of the territorial sea upon the land 
domain; 
2. the more or less close relationship existing between certain 
sea areas and the land formations which divide or surround 
them; [ and] 
3. economic interests peculiar to a region, the reality and im• 
portance of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage.60 
The court's approval of the Norwegian system heralded a totally 
new approach to the delineation of inland waters. The decision re-
jected any mathematical limitation on baselines, and, by approving 
the straight-baseline method, the court sanctioned the subjection of 
large areas of water previously thought of as marginal or high seas 
to the exclusive jurisdiction of coastal nations. The significance of 
this approval can readily be shown by reference to the accepted 
methods of delineation which preceded it. Formerly, islands abut-
ting a coast were treated as separate land areas, possessing their own 
inland waters and marginal seas.60 Water areas which were 
between the islands and the coast, but outside the marginal-sea 
belt of either land mass, were defined as high seas. Even if an 
island were within six miles of a coast, the intervening water areas 
were considered marginal seas, and were therefore subject to rights 
of innocent passage by foreign vessels.61 The straight-baseline 
method, which treats island clusters as extensions of the coast, may 
therefore have an enormous effect on the maritime rights of nations. 
The Fisheries Case, coupled with general concern over the lack 
of fixed standards for ascertaining inland waters, set the stage for 
debate on the question at the First Law of the Sea Conference con-
vened at Geneva in 1958.62 This conference was the first serious at-
59. Id. at 133. 
60. See COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAw OF THE SEA 103·04 (5th rev. ed. 1962): Letter 
from Secretary Webb to Attorney General McGrath, Nov, 13, 1951, Hearings on S.J. 
Res. 13 Before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 460, at 461 (1953); Pearcy, Measurement of ·the United States Territorial Sea, 
U.S. Bureau of Public Affairs, Dep't of State Publication No. 6879 (1959). 
61. A strait between an island or islands and the mainland may not be subjected 
to the exclusive control of a coastal nation, regardless of width, if the strait serves as a 
useful route for international passage between two areas of high seas. Judgment of 
April 9, 1949, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, 28 (Corfu Channel Case). The fact that international 
traffic is limited, or almost non-existent, is not decisive. See I SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND 
SEA BOUNDARIES 75-76 (1962) • 
• 6!:t. The Conference was convened pursuant to a resolution of the United Nations 
General Assembly. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 11th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 54 (A/3572) 
(1957), stated that the General Assembly: "Decides, in accordance with the recom• 
mendation contained in paragraph 28 of the report of the International Law Com• 
mission covering the work of its eighth session, that an international conference of 
plenipotentiaries should be convoked to examine the law of the sea, taking account 
not only of the legal but also of the technical, biological, economic and political as• 
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tempt to establish a codification of the law of the sea since the Inter-
national Conference at The Hague in 1930. Although the Geneva 
Conference, like its predecessor, was unable to resolve the key ques-
tion of the maximum width of the territorial sea, 68 it did result in 
general agreement on rules for the maximum length of baselines for 
inland bays, as well as the establishment of a series of conditions £or 
the use of straight baselines. 
Although the Fisheries Case apparently destroyed the possibility 
of adopting the ten-mile rule for bays, the majority of the partici-
pants at Geneva agreed that some limitation on the length of the 
bay-closing line was necessary.64 The effect of this concurrence of 
opinion is reflected in article 7 of the adopted Convention on the 
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which provides that where the 
distance between the low-water marks of natural entrance points of a 
bay exceeds twenty-four miles, a straight baseline of twenty-four 
miles shall be drawn within the bay in such a manner as' to enclose 
the maximum area of water. Waters landward of the line are inland 
waters of the coastal nation. 
It is quite clear, however, that before such a baseline can be ap-
plied in particular cases there must be a prior determination of what 
types of indentations qualify as "bays." Indiscriminate application 
of the twenty-four mile rule to each curvature in the coast, regardless 
of depth, would obviously be inconsistent with the overall purpose 
of the rule to recognize the legitimate interests of a nation over its 
coastal waters. Therefore, the Convention adopted the so-called 
semi-circular test of definition. Under this test, as expressed in 
article 7 of the Convention, true bays must constitute more than 
mere curvatures in the coast, contain landlocked waters, and contain 
an area as large or larger than that of a semi-circle whose diameter 
is a line drawn across the mouth of the indentation. 65 
pects of the problem, and to embody the results of its work in one or more interna-
tional conventions or such other instruments as it may deem appropriate • • • ." 
Eighty-six nations and more than seven hundred delegates attended the Conference. 
A review of their work is found in Jessup, The United Nations Conference on the Law 
of the Sea, 59 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 234 (1959). 
63. A second conference convened in Geneva on March 17, 1960, and was also 
unable to reach agreement on this matter. See 1 SHALOWITZ, op. cit. supra note 61, at 
269-76. 
64. The draft articles prepared for the Convention by the International Law Com-
mission originally incorporated a closing line of twenty-five miles. When the proposal 
met with a cool reception by some states, the Commission reduced the line to fifteen 
miles. 1956 I.L.C. YEARBOOK I, 190-93, 195-97. 
65. The full text of article 7 is as follows: 
I. This article relates only to bays the coasts of which belong to a single State. 
2. For the purposes of these articles, a bay is a well-marked indentation whose 
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The Convention was also successful in reaching agreement on 
limiting the application of the straight-baseline method for delineat-
ing inland waters. Article 4 recognizes that a coastal nation may 
establish straight baselines from point to point on its coast if the 
following conditions exist: (1) The coastline is deeply indented or 
cut into, or there is a fringe of islands in the immediate vicinity of 
the coast; (2) the drawing of baselines does not depart to an appre-
ciable extent from the general direction of the coast; and (3) the sea 
areas within the lines bear a sufficient nexus to the land areas to be 
subject to the domain of the nation over its internal waters. 
In addition to establishing standards for the application of the 
straight-baseline method, the Convention imposed specific limits on 
its utilization in -certain areas. Section 5 of article 4 prohibits the 
use of straight baselines where the effect is to cut off from the high 
seas the territorial waters of another nation. Section 2 of article 5 
specifies that if straight baselines enclose waters previously thought 
to be territorial or high seas, a right of innocent passage exists 
through such waters. Thus in essence the Convention created a new 
concept of inland waters which could be subject to international 
rights.66 
penetration is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain land-
locked waters and constitute more than a mere curvature of the coast. An inden-
tation shall not, however, be regarded as a bay unless its area is as large as, or 
larger than, that of the semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the 
mouth of that indentation. 
3. For the purpose of measurement, the area of an indentation is that lying 
between the low-water mark around the shore of the indentation and a line join-
ing the low-water marks of its natural entrance points. Where, because of the 
presence of islands, an indentation has more than one mouth, the semi-circle shall 
be drawn on a line as long as the sum total of the lengths of the lines across the 
different mouths. Islands within an indentation shall be included as if they were 
part of the water areas of the indentation. 
4. If the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance points 
of a bay does not exceed twenty-four miles, a closing line may be drawn between 
these two lo,v-water marks, and the waters enclosed thereby shall be considered as 
internal waters. · 
5. Where the distance between the low-water marks of the natural entrance 
points of a bay exceeds twenty-four miles, a straight baseline of twenty-four miles 
shall be drawn within the bay in such a manner as to enclose the maximum area 
of water that is possible with a line of that length. 
6. The foregoing provisions shall not apply to so-called "historic" bays, or in 
any case where the straight baseline system provided for in article 4 is applied. 
Convention on ,the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, art, 7, 
T.I.A.S. No. 5639. 
66. Aside from the two major issues covered in article 4, para. 5, and article 5, 
para. 2, the Convention also disposed of a multitude of other boundary problems, 
The difficulties associated with measurement of the marginal sea from harbors were 
resolved by article 8, which prescribes measurement from "the outermost permanent 
harbour works which form an integral part of the harbour system." Article 13 pro-
vides that if a river flows directly into the sea, the marginal sea is to be measured , 
from a straight line drawn across the mouth between points on the low tide line of 
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The ratification of twenty-two nations required by the Conven-
tion was achieved on September 10, 1964. Consequently, there are 
at present established rules of international law defining the extent 
of the inland waters of coastal nations. These rules, in part, recognize 
that all "true" bays which may be enclosed by a twenty-four mile 
closing line are inland bays of the coastal nation. In addition, if con-
ditions are proper, a nation may establish straight baselines as the 
line of demarcation between inland waters and the marginal sea. 
B. The Inland-Water Policy of the Executive Branch 
The rules of international law defining inland waters are, to a 
large extent, permissive. Thus, within certain limits individual na-
tions are free to formulate the ~les of definition which they feel 
can most reasonably be applied to their coasts. The establishment of 
such rules for the coast of the United States is peculiarly and tradi-
tionally a function of the executive branch of the Government.67 
Early in the nation's dev~lopment, claims over inland waters 
were understandably vague. Secretary of State Jefferson, in a letter 
to French Secretary Genet, -claimed authority over all "landlocked 
bays" •Of the United States, but he offered no explanation as to how 
those bays were to be defined.68 Similarly, without reference to clos-
ing lines of any nature, Attorney General Edmund Randolph once 
asserted an American claim to all of Chesapeake Bay, which is twelve 
miles in width.69 The first precise statement of United States policy 
on inland waters appears in a letter dated May 28, 1886, from Sec-
retary of State Bayard to Treasury Secretary Manning.70 Referring 
to the propriety of drawing a baseline between headlands within 
bays, Secretary Bayard stated that "the headland theory, as it is 
called, has been uniformly rejected by our Government .... "71 
its banks. Article 11 specifies what low tide elevations may be used for measurement 
of the marginal sea. Article 10 reasserts the doctrine that each island possesses its own 
marginal sea. 
67. As a general matter, the extent of United States sovereignty is a political 
question, "the determination of which by the legislative and executive departments 
of any government conclusively binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens 
and subjects of that government." Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890). 
See also Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948); United States v. Cali-
fornia, 332 U.S. 19 (1947); Pearcy v. Stranahan, 205 U.S. 257 (1907); In re Cooper, 143 
U.S. 472 (1892). Congress has never acted in any manner to define the inland waters 
of the nation, with the result that the actions of the executive branch stand alone in 
this field. 
68. 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, FOREIGN RELATIONS 183 (1833). 
69. l OPs. ATT'Y GEN. 32 (1793). 
70. 1 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 149, at 718-21 (1906). 
71. While rejecting the utilization of any baseline for the United States coast, the 
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As the ten-mile baseline became sanctioned by continued use, 
the United States eventually adopted this standard in its interna-
tional affairs. On February 15, 1888, following a pattern suggested 
by Umpire Bates in the case of The Washington,72 the State Depart-
ment entered into a treaty with Great Britain which incorporated 
the ·ten-mile rule.73 Notwithstanding the fact that the Senate rejected 
this treaty, 74 the State Department apparently remained convinced 
that a ten-mile closing line was proper under international law, and 
counsel for the United States asserted the applicability of the rule 
in the Alaska Boundary Arbitration of 1904.75 At the Hague Con-
ference of 1930, the United States urged_ the adoption of the ten-mile 
standard as proper for defining inland waters within bays.76 On 
November 13, 1951, Acting Secretary of State Webb declared Ameri-
can adherence to the ten-mile rule in a detailed letter to Attorney 
General McGrath, and this policy was reaffirmed in a subsequent 
letter from Secretary of State Acheson to the Attorney General on 
February 12, 1952.77 
Secretary Acheson's declaration was necessitated by the fact that 
the Fisheries Case had substantially destroyed the foundation on 
which previous American policy had been premised. As the Secre-
tary noted, "some ... principles on which this United States position 
has been traditionally predicated have been deemed by the Court 
not to have acquired the authority of a general rule of international 
Secretary nonetheless recognized the practice of other nations. "The doctrine is new 
and has received a proper limit in the convention between France and Great Britain 
of the 2d of August, 1839, in which it is equally agreed that the distance of three 
miles fixed as the general limit for the exclusive right of fishery upon the coasts of 
the two countries shall, with respect to bays the mouths of which do not exceed ten 
miles in width, be measured from a straight line drawn from headland to headland." 
Id. at 719. 
72. 4 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ArulITRATIONS 4342 (1898). 
73. Article III provided: "The three marine miles mentioned in Article I of the 
convention of October 20, 1818 shall be measured seaward from low water mark; but 
at every bay, creek, harbor, not otherwise. specially provided for in this Treaty, such 
three marine miles shall be measured seaward from a straight line drawn across the 
bay, creek, or harbor, in the part nearest the entrance at the first point where the 
width does not exceed ten marine miles." 2 S. Misc. Doc. No. 109, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. 
156 (1888). 
74. 19 CONG. REc. 7768 (1888). 
75. The arbitration involved the location of the boundary between southern Alaska 
and Canada, which, in the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1825, was set at ten leagues in-
land from the "coast." The arguments pertaining to boundaries may be found in 7 
Alaska Boundary Arbitration, S. Doc. No. 162, 58th Cong., 2d Sess. 844 (1904). 
76. 3 Aars OF THE CONFERENCE FOR THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL I.Aw 197-99 
(Leagne of Nations Pub. No. 1930, v. 16). 
77. The two letters are printed in Hearings on S.J. Res. 13, supra note 60, at 460-
62. 
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law."78 Primary among those principles were the ten-mile baseline 
rule and the measurement of the marginal sea from the sinuosities 
of the coast. As the Secretary was careful to point out, the failure of 
the court to accept the foregoing principles ~s rules of international 
law did not mean that they were in conflict with that law. Indeed, 
the decision left "the choice of the method of delimitation applicable 
under such criteria to the national state."79 Exercising its prerogative 
in this regard, the Department of State specifically refused to utilize 
straight baselines to delineate inland waters of the nation, and con-
firmed its adherence to the ten-mile rule as proper for definition of 
inland bays. 
The United States was a signatory of the Geneva Convention, 
and although the Department of State undoubtedly would have 
preferred the adoption of less liberal rules for delineating maritime 
boundaries, particularly in reference to the twenty-four mile closing 
line for bays, the chairman of the American delegation to the Con-
vention subsequently indicated that the United States was not dis-
satisfied with any of the final provisions.80 The Senate indicated its 
consent to the Convention in 1960,81 and on March 24, 1961, presi-
dential ratification was attained. Acting under the terms of the 
Convention, the United States has subsequently claimed that all 
American bays which may be closed by a twenty-four mile line are 
inland waters.82 The Government has not, however, sought to apply 
the straight-baseline method to any portion of the United States 
coast. 
C. Inland Waters as Defined by Congress-The Submerged 
Lands Act 
Thus far, we have considered the definition of inland waters 
within the framework of international relations. Although the def-
initions utilized by the executive branch of our government have 
obvious domestic· significance, the definitions themselves are not 
based entirely on internal considerations. Whatever definitions the 
United States adopts for itself will affect, at least indirectly, the in-
terests of other nations, and the constantly reiterated desire of this 
78. Id. at 462. 
79. Ibid. 
80. See Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Executives 
]. to N. Inclusive, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (Question No. 29) (1960). 
81, 106 CONG. REc. 11187-96 (1960). . 
82. Letter from Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, to Robert Kennedy, Attorney Gen-
eral, Jan. 15, 1963, in 2 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 527 (1963). 
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nation to maximize the extent of the high seas has had a significant 
limiting effect on our own claims to inland waters. 88 
Congressional passage of the Submerged Lands Act created the 
necessity for a definitiqn of inland waters in an entirely different 
context. The primary purpose of the act was to provide for a divi-
sion of offshore mineral resources between state and federal author-
ity. Since the areas in question had already been claimed by the 
federal government as against all other nations, the statutory def-
inition of inland waters adopted in the act would not affect the 
foreign policy of the executive branch. Thus, Congress was free to 
adopt whatever definition of the term it felt would best effectuate 
the policies of the act. 
The significance of a definition of "inland waters," as used in the 
act, is twofold. First, the congressional grant of lands underlying 
navigable waters within state boundaries is limited to three miles 
from the "coast line" in most cases and three leagues from the coast 
in limited instances.84 The term "coast line" is, in part, defined as 
the "seaward limit of inland waters."80 Second, for those states which 
had no clearly defined maritime boundary at the date of passage, the 
act permits an extension of current boundaries to three miles from 
the "coast line."86 A definition of inland waters is therefore indis-
pensable for proper application of the act. 
Although the necessity for a definition seems clear, congressional 
understanding of that necessity was apparently absent. Indeed, the 
legislative history of the act indicates a deliberate failure by 
Congress to specify any theory of inland-water measurement. One 
of the early Senate resolutions defined the "coast line" in the follow-
ing terms: 
The term "coast line" means the line of ordinary low water 
along that portion of the coast which is in direct contact with 
the open sea and the line marking the seaward limit of inland 
waters, which include all estuaries, ports, harbors, bays, chan-
nels, straits, historic bays, and sounds, and all other bodies of 
water which join the open sea.81 
The Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs requested 
State Department analysis of the boundary questions raised by the 
legislation. In response, the Department presented extensive testi-
83. See Hearings on S.J. Res. 13, supra note 60, at 1053 (testimony of Mr. Tate). 
84. Submerged Lands Act § 2(b), 67 Stat. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 130l(b) (1964). 
85. Submerged Lands Act § 2(c), 67 Stat. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 130l(c) (1964). 
86. Submerged Lands Act § 4, 67 Stat. 31 (1953), 43 U.S.C. § 1312 (1964). 
87. See Hearings on S.J. Res. IJ, supra note 60, at 1051-58. (Emphasis added.) 
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mony,88 making it clear that the ten-mile rule was firmly established 
as an Executive definition of inland waters within bays and that 
the straight-baseline method of the Fisheries Gase had not been 
adopted.89 On the basis of this testimony, the Committee deleted all 
of the explanatory language following the words "inland waters," 
leaving the term without qualification. In explanation of its action, 
the Committee stated: 
The words "which include all estuaries, ports, harbors, bays, 
channels, straits, historic bays, and sounds, and all other bodies 
of watei: which join the open sea" have been deleted from the 
reported bill because of the committee's belief that the question 
of what constitutes inland waters should be left where Congress 
finds it. The committee is convinced that the definition neither 
adds nor takes away anything a State may have now in the way 
of a coast and the lands underneath waters behind it. 
In this connection, however, the committee states categori-
cally that the deletion of the quoted language in no way con-
stitutes an indication that the so-called "Boggs Formula," the 
rule limiting bays to areas whose headlands are not more than 
IO miles apart, or the artificial "arcs of circles" method is or 
should be the policy of the United States in delimiting inland 
waters or defining coastlines.90 
While refusing to adopt the specific definition of inland waters 
utilized by the executive branch, the legislative branch. concurrently 
refused to provide its own standard of measurement. This refusal 
stemmed from the congressional assumption that a definition of in-
land waters had already been firmly established by the judiciary, as 
evidenced by the fact that debate on the act is replete with references 
to the judicially "fixed" definition of inland waters.91 In fact, how-
88. See testimony of Mr. Tate, Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State, 
Hearings on S.J. Res. l!J, supra note 60, at 1051-86. 
89. Id. at 1052, 1058. 
90. 2 U.S. CODE CONG.&: An. NEWS 1493 (1953). 
91. For instance, in explanation of the deletion of the language from § 2(c), Senator 
Cordon stated: "It was not the chairman's view that we were attempting to draw a 
line delimiting inland waters, but that we were using a term that is well known in the 
law and is defined by the Court in the California case, for instance, and in the Louis-
iana case, I assume." (Emphasis added.) Hearings on S.J. Res. l!J, supra note 60, at 
1376. In later debates, Senator Cordon answered an assertion that the committee had 
rejected ·the Boggs formula by saying: "The committee, as I recall, and I think I am 
correct, neither accepted nor rejected the Boggs formula or any other formula." 99 
CONG. R.Ec. 2633 (1953). In reference to California's boundary claim, Senator Holland 
remarked: "The Senator from Florida believes that the laws, as announced over and 
over and over again by the Supreme Court, as to the delimitation of inland waters, 
. are sufficiently fixed, definite, and certain so that it would require a complete, 
cataclysmic change of the Supreme Court's philosophy in that field to afford any 
hope for an extension of the boundaries of the good State of California so that they 
would go out beyond the islands as to all areas contained within an outer line." 99 
CONG. REc. 275 (1953). 
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ever, this congressional assumption was completely at variance with 
reality. The Supreme Court, prior to the passage of the Submerged 
Lands Act, had only once indicated an opinion as to whether par-
ticular waters were "inland," and it had done so in a manner which 
bore no relation to an overall definition of the term.92 Moreover the 
lower courts indicated a complete disparity of views. The District 
Court in Alaska, citing Kent's Commentaries, had held that Cook 
Inlet, a body of water forty miles across at its mouth, was inland.98 
Similarly, after referring to the Webster's Dictionary definition of a 
"bay," a California court upheld the jurisdiction of the State of 
California over Monterey Bay, which is eighteen miles wide at its 
mouth.04 Other courts had defined inland waters on totally unrelated 
grounds.95 
The assumed judicial definition of inland waters, therefore, was at 
best contradictory, and at worst totally absent. The result of this 
absence was an obvious confusion as to the respective rights of 
federal and state governments in offshore lands, a confusion which 
ultimately necessitated judicial resolution. 
D. The Judicial Definition of Inland Waters-United States 
v. California,96 1965 
The dispute between the federal government and the State of 
California was initially concerned solely with title to lands underly-
ing the three-mile marginal belt. The Supreme Court's first deci-
sion in this matter, in 1947, settled that issue in favor of the federal 
government but left open for determination the precise location of 
the subject lands.07 To obtain evidence necessary for a judicial deter-
92. In Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 258 (1891), the Court, in de• 
termining the inland waters of Massachusetts, commented: "We think it must be 
regarded as established that, as between nations, the minimum limit of the terri• 
torial jurisdiction of a nation over tide-waters is a marine league from its coast; that 
bays wholly within its territory not exceeding two marine leagues in width at the 
mouth are within this limit • • • ," Since the bay in question was less than six miles 
wide at its mouth, the Court was not required to establish the maximum limits for 
inland waters. 
93. The Kodiak, 53 Fed. 126 (D. Alaska 1892). Since the enactment of the Sub• 
merged Lands Act, a Superior Court in Alaska has held that all waters of Bristol 
Bay landward of a line 160 miles in length across the bay are territorial waters of 
the state. Alaska v. Arctic Maid Fisheries, No. 7093-A, Super. Ct. Alaska, 1st Jud. 
Dist., 1962. The United States filed an amicus curiae brief in the Alaska Supreme 
Court urging reversal, but the case was subsequently dismissed. 
94. Ocean Indus., Inc. v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. 235, 252 Pac. 722 (1927). 
95. See United States v. Carrillo, 13 F. Supp. 121 (S.D. Cal. 1935) (San Pedro 
Bay); People v. Stralla, 14 Cal. 2d 617, 96 P.2d 941 (1939) (Santa Monica Bay). 
96. 381 U.S. 139 (1965). 
97. See text accompanying notes 9-14 supra. 
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mination of the baseline separating the inland waters of the state 
from the marginal sea, the Court referred the case to a Special 
Master, restricting the hearing to seven disputed segments of the 
California coast. The Master's report was submitted to the Court in 
1952,98 but the case was seemingly rendered moot by the intervening 
passage of the Submerged Lands Act, granting marginal sea lands to 
the states. The matter remained technically before the Supreme 
Court, but was allowed to lie dormant.99 
As oil exploration moved seaward, however, the outer limit of 
the marginal belt became as significant for states as· the seaward limit 
of inland waters had been at the time of the initial decision. Since 
the former limit is directly related to the latter, it was obvious that 
the issues basic to the Master's hearing were also crucial to an ulti-
mate determination of the case, and that the passage of the Sub-
merged Lands Act, rather than rendering the issues moot, had 
merely modified them. The Government therefore filed an amended 
complaint in 1963~ squarely presenting for the Supreme Court's 
determination a definition of the term "inland waters," not as 
originally considered by the Master, but rather as utilized by Con-
gress in the Submerged Lands Act.100 
The areas in controversy fell into two major categories. The pri-
mary area of dispute, designated the "overall unit area," consisted 
of waters circumscribed by a line drawn from the California main-
land to a series of islands, some as much as fifty miles from the coast, 
and then returning to the mainland. The secondary area consisted 
of a series of ·unrelated indentations along the coast.101 
The United States' position toward all the disputed areas was 
simple and direct: Congress, in adopting the Submerged Lands Act, 
had incorporated into its provisions the contemporaneous definition 
of inland waters espoused by the executive branch. Under this 
theory, the "overall unit area" did not qualify as inland waters since 
it utilized the straight-baseline principle, which had been specifically 
rejected by the State Department.102 The claims of California over 
the various coastal indentations were rejected, on the theory that all 
but one of the indentations failed to qualify as "bays" under all 
98. The Master's report· is reprinted in 1 SHALOWITZ, op. cit. supra note 61, at 
329-53. 
99. See United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 148 (1965). 
100. Id. at 149. 
101. The geographic extent of the disputed areas is shown in the maps constitut-
ing appendixes A, B, and C to the Court's opinion. · 
102. See text following note 79 supra. 
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recognized theories of inland water measurement. While one in-
dentation, Monterey Bay, did qualify as a "bay" under the present 
policy of the executive branch, the Government argued that since 
the bay was eighteen miles wide at its mouth and since United States 
policy at the time of the adoption of the Submerged Lands Act rec-
ognized only a ten-mile closing line, the area was not inland waters 
of the state within the meaning of the act. 
California presented several alternative arguments in defense of 
its claims. First, it argued that since the Submerged Lands Act 
was designed to restore the states to the position they were thought 
to be in prior to the Court's decision in the first California case, the 
terms of the act should be construed liberally as a congressional ap-
proval of state "belief" as to the limits of their inland waters prior 
to 1947. Alternatively, California argued that the Submerged Lands 
Act should be interpreted consistently with international law, and 
that, under the law of nations, all areas claimed by it were inland 
waters. The utilization of a straight baseline to circumscribe the 
"overall unit area" was justified on the basis of the Fisheries Case 
and article 4 of the Geneva Convention.103 Similarly, the claim to 
Monterey Bay was, in California's view, sanctioned by article 5 of 
the Convention. The remainder of the areas, while not true "bays" 
under international law, were claimed by the state on the th~ory 
that the indentations qualified as inland waters under recognized 
exceptions to that law. Specifically, California relied on the doctrine 
of historic waters, under which a nation's claim to extraordinary 
areas as inland waters is valid upon a showing of a continuous exer-
cise of uncontested and exclusive jurisdiction.104 
The Supreme Court summarily rejected California's initial con-
tention that the Submerged Lands Act constituted a congressional 
sanction of state "beliefs" as to the extent of their inland waters. In 
this regard, the Court stated: 
Indeed, if the Court is to draw any inference from the intent 
and structure of the Act as to how inland waters should be de-
fined, the most plausible inference would be that Congress, in 
adopting the three-mile limitation, must have intended some 
base line to be used other than one dependent upon each 
State's subjective concept of its inland waters, for such a limita-
tion would prove to have been none at all .•.. 105 
103. See text following note 65 supra. 
104. For a general discussion of the historic-waters doctrine, see Direct United 
States Cable Co. v. Anglo-American Tel. Co., 2 App. Cas. 394 (P.C. 1877) (Newfound-
land); Judicial Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, U.N. Doc. No. 
A/CN.4/143 (1962); Historic Bays, U.N. Doc. No. A/CONF.13/1 (1957). 
105. 381 U.S. at 158-60. 
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The Court's initial conclusion reduced the issue to a direct clash 
between nvo sources of interpretation of the term "inland waters." 
California relied on international law; the United States relied on 
the policy of the executive branch. Unfortunately, while the conflict 
may have been clear, its resolution was not. Both positions suffered 
from serious d~ficiencies, and the adoption of either one in its en-
tirety would have created more complexity than would have been 
resolved. 
If international' law is looked to as the basis upon which to in-
terpret a 1953 statute, a determination must be made as to the man-
ner in which inland waters were defined by the law of nations at 
the relevant date. The difficulty with· this procedure is that, except 
for a few extremely vague rules of relationship between lands and 
waters, there were no internationally recognized principles of defini-
tion in 1953. In fact, the International Court had specifically rejected 
the existence of any mathematically precise rules for delineating bays 
or any other inland water areas.106 Therefore, if the Submerged 
Lands Act were to be interpreted in accordance with international 
law in force at the time of its adoption, courts would be faced with 
the incredibly complex task of determining the inland waters of each 
state by utilizing the geographical, economic, and historical stand- . 
ards announced by the International Court.107 
Even assuming that this multitude of subjective determinations 
could be made as a practical matter, the application of international 
law in this area is still subject to a basic objection. That law estab-
lishes the maximum extent of inland waters which may be claimed 
by a coastal nation, but it does not pretend to establish national 
boundaries at that point. Similarly, while California might have 
argued that its claims to inland waters could have been made by the 
United States, it would still have been faced with the burden of 
showing that the federal government had actually sought to exer-
cise rights to the maximum extent sanctioned by international law. 
Moreover, this burden would appear to be almost insuperable in 
view of the specific rejection of the full exercise of international 
rights by the Secretary of State at the time the Submerged Lands 
Act was adopted.108 
The United States' reliance on the contemporaneous policy of 
the executive branch as a basis for interpreting the act admittedly 
106. See text accompanying notes 58-61 supra. 
107. See text accompanying note 59 supra. 
108. Letters of Acting Secretary Webb and Secretary Acheson, Hearings on S.J. 
Res. 1J Before the Senate Committee on Int. and Ins. Affairs, 83d Cong., ,1st Sess. 
460-62 (1953). 
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avoided the difficulties of subjectivity. Executive policy defining in-
land waters, which had been carefully explained to Congress,100 con-
sisted of the adoption of the ten-mile closing line for bays and a flat 
rejection of the straight-baseline theory. However, although the 
policy was clear, it was apparently unacceptable. The Senate Com-
mittee specifically refused to approve the policy,11° and there is no 
evidence in the debates of a contrary intent on the part of Congress 
as a whole. 
Notwithstanding the refusal of Congress to sanction the State 
Department's policy on inland waters, the Government argued that 
the act should still be interpreted in accordance with that position. 
In the Government's view, acts of Congress utilizing the terminology 
of foreign affairs must be interpreted in accordance with the policy 
of the executive branch, unless Congress specifically rejects that 
policy. While this position is clearly justified when the congressional 
act in question involves foreign affairs,111 it is totally unfounded as 
applied to domestic legislation. As the Supreme Court has pointed 
out, the Submerged Lands Act involves a division of offshore re-
sources as between the state and federal governments and is un-
related to foreign affairs. The policy of the executive branch, which 
is vested with authority over foreign relations, is therefore of no 
relevancy in ascertaining the definition of a term used in purely 
domestic legislation. 
The Supreme Court's resolution of the interpretative problems 
created by the necessity of defining inland waters for the purposes 
of the Submerged Lands Act is an outstanding example of pragmatic 
judicial reasoning. The Court sought not so much a standard that 
was theoretically defensible as one that would work. While its de-
cision may defy complete logical justification, it unquestionably 
represents a reasonable solution to a problem which appeared, at 
least superficially, insoluble. -The major problem of interpretation-
that of determining what standards Congress intended by its use of 
the term "inland waters"-was disposed of by the Court's holding 
109. See text accompanying note 89 supra. 
110. See text accompanying notes 90 8: 91 supra. 
111. Cf. In re Cooper, 143 U.S. 472 (1892), where congressional re-adoption of an 
act asserting jurisdiction in the Bering Sea was interpreted as incorporating the 
previous understanding of the executive branch. The Court commented: "[T)here 
is much force in the position that, whatever the reason for the conservative course 
pursued by the Senate [in not defining the extent of jurisdiction in the Bering Sea), the 
enactment of this section, with full knowledge of the executive action already had 
and of the diplomatic situation, justified the President in the conclusion that it was 
his duty ••• to adhere to the construction already insisted upon as to the e.xtent of 
the dominion of the United States, and to continue to act accordingly," Id, at li02, 
February 1966] Maritime Boundaries 663 
that Congress had intended no standards whatsoever. In the Court's 
view, "Congress, in passing the Act, left the responsibility for de-
fining inland waters to this Court."112 More significant, the Court 
stated that "it is our opinion that we best fill our responsibility of 
giving content to the words which Congress employed by adopting 
the best and most workable definitions available."113 
It is obvious, of course, that a "responsibility for defining inland 
waters" is substantially different from adoption of a "workable def-
inition." Every judicial interpretation of a legislative act involves a 
responsibility for definition. This truism, however, is no justification 
for deliberate judicial adoption of definitions, and, indeed, the 
Court has commonly rejected attempts by Congress to delegate its 
responsibilities.114 In this instance, however, the Court found just 
such a delegation and specifically accepted it without extended dis-
cussion. With this freedom to select standards of definition which 
would prove most "workable," the· Court turned to those of greatest 
certainty. It adopted in toto the definitions of the Geneva Conven-
tion of the Law of the Sea, which was written five years after passage 
of the Submerged Lands Act and which did not become effective 
until over ten years after passage of the act. The Court stated: 
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone, approved by the Senate and ratified by the President, pro-
vides such [workable] definitions. We adopt them for purposes 
of the Submerged Lands Act. This establishes a single coastline 
for both the administration of the Submerged Lands Act and 
the conduct of our future international relations (barring an 
unexpected change in the rules established by the Convention). 
Furthermore the comprehensiveness of the Convention provides 
answers to many of the lesser problems related to coastlines 
which, absent the Convention, would be most troublesome.115 
The selection of the Convention as a source of definition did not, 
in itself, resolve all the issues in the case. It was still necessary for 
the Court to apply those definitions to the particular water areas in-
volved. One area? that of Monterey Bay, lent itself to easy resolution. 
Since this indentation clearly met the requirements of article 7 of 
the Convention for a "bay"116 and was only eighteen miles wide at 
112. 381 U.S. at 164. 
113. Id. at 165. 
114. See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); 
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); United States v. Todd, 54 U.S. (13 
How.) 52 (1794). See also Annot., 168 A.L.R. 826 (1947); Annot., 69 A.L.R. 267 (1930). 
115. 381 U.S. at 165. 
116. See note 65 supra. 
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its mouth, it satisfied the criteria necessary for classification as inland 
waters.117 
In contrast, California's claim to certain coastal indentations as 
"historic waters" was summarily denied. In the Court's view, there 
was not a sufficient showing of the continuous and exclusive author-
ity over the waters necessary for justification of such a claim under 
the Convention. In passing, the Court refused to sanction the Gov-
ernment's argument that no claim could be made to historic waters 
unless endorsed by the federal government. The relevancy of a 
Government disclaimer was recognized, but only in situations where 
claims were "questionable." The Court was reluctant to hold that 
such a disclaimer would be effective to bar clearly defined historic 
claims, and therefore at least impliedly left this issue for later deter-
mination.118 
The most difficult question involved the validity of California's 
utilization of straight baselines to include the "overall unit area."119 
While much of the argument centered on whether the California 
coast satisfied the criteria necessary for the establishment of such 
baselines under international law,120 the Court never reached an 
analysis of this issue. It denied California's claim, holding that the 
authority to extend inland waters by the straight-baseline method 
was vested exclusively in the federal government, and that 
California may not use such baselines to extend our interna-
tional boundaries ... against the expressed opposition of the 
United States .... [A]n extension of state sovereignty to an 
international area by claiming it as inland water would neces-
sarily also extend national sovereignty, and unless the Federal 
Government's responsibility for questions of external sover-
eignty is hollow, it must have the power to prevent States from 
so enlarging themselves.121 
California's utilization of straight baselines was dubious at best, 
but the Court's theory of rejection also appears unsound. An "ex-
tension" of California's inland water boundary under the terms of 
the Submerged Lands Act would not, at least in theory, impinge on 
federal responsibility in foreign affairs. Indeed, in two cases involv-
ing Texas and Florida the Court specifically recognized that a 
boundary established for the purposes of the Submerged Lands Act 
117. 381 U.S. at 172. 
118. Id. at 175. 
119. See text accompanying note 101 supra. 
120. See text following note 55 supra. 
121. 381 U.S. at 168. 
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in excess of the national claim did not create conflicts with foreign 
policy.122 While the waters in question in those two cases were 
marginal-sea areas, the same principles should be applicable to 
inland waters. 
It would appear that strict reliance on the terms of the Geneva 
Convention would have resulted in a similar rejection of California's 
baseline claim without the necessity of raising the spectre of state 
interference in foreign affairs. Under the permissive terms of the 
Convention, waters are considered inland only if a coastal nation 
makes the necessary assertion of jurisdiction. Without that assertion, 
the waters continue to be high or marginal seas, as the case may be. 
California's utilization of baselines would have resulted in the en-
closure of waters which, under the terms of the Convention, were 
regarded as high seas by the federal government. The enclosure, 
because of its limited effect, would not have conflicted with foreign 
policy, but rather with the judicially adopted definition of inland 
waters for the purposes of the Submerged Lands Act. 
The existence of apparent logical difficulties should not diminish 
the significance of the California decision. For the purposes of 
inland-water definition, the Court has selected an eminently "work-
able" framework. With only limited exceptions, the problems 
created by inland-bay measurement have been resolved. Similarly, 
numerous minor difficulties inherent in inland-water measurement 
are clarified by adoption of the provisions of the Geneva Convention 
in the same manner that they were clarified in international law. 
While future Executive action may again raise questions concerning 
straight baselines, it is at least settled that the system may not at 
present be used to define the inland waters of any state. 
E. A Proposed Definition of the Inland Waters of the States 
Superficial analysis of the California decision may lead to the 
conclusion that all major issues concerning inland-water boundary 
delineation have been judicially resolved. Such an assumption, how-
ever, is inconsistent with the limited nature of the holding. In fact, 
the only issue before the Court in California was a definition of 
inland-water boundaries for the purposes of the Submerged Lands 
Act. While the holding in effect established an inland-water bound-
ary for those states which extended their boundaries under authority 
of the act, it neither attempted nor purported to affect state bound-
122, See text accompanying notes 34-39 supra. 
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aries established by Congress prior or subsequent to the passage of 
the act. As a necessary conclusion to this analysis of inland waters, 
therefore, it is relevant to consider the manner in which the inland-
water boundary for the remaining states will be defined. The dis-
tinction suggested here is subtle, but nevertheless significant. Each 
state entered the Union with some express or implied boundary cir-
cumscribing its inland water areas. Obviously, the seaward limit 
of inland waters necessary to a determination of the respective 
boundaries must have had some meaning as of the date of admission, 
but that meaning is not necessarily the same as the "seaward limit 
of inland waters" as the term is used in the Submerged Lands Act.128 
The possible existence of state boundaries distinct from those 
established by the Submerged Lands Act suggests one obvious anom-
aly. Theoretically, at least, a state might enter the Union with inland 
waters in excess of the specifications in the Submerged Lands Act; 
by virtue of the holding in Pollard v. Hagan,124 all lands underlying 
those inland waters are subject to state ownership as an inherent 
attribute of sovereignty. As a result, the state would possess more 
lands under the Pollard doctrine than it would through the Sub-
merged Lands Act. 
Before attempting to define the inland waters of the various 
states outside the scope of the Submerged Lands Act, one important 
fact should be noted: not a single act of admission specifies, with any 
degree of clarity, the extent of inland waters within the various 
states' boundaries. The few acts of admission or congressionally 
approved state constitutions which do contain any maritime bound-
ary provisions are couched in the most general of terms. California's 
constitution, for instance, makes reference to "bays," without further 
definition.120 Alaska's act of admission defines the state as including 
appurtenant '.'territorial waters," but there is no particularization 
of the means by which those waters are to be measured.120 Other 
acts contain similar, or even less specific, language.127 
123. The Supreme Court was careful to note the distinction in its analysis of the 
meaning of the Submerged Lands Act. In the Court's view, congressional insertion 
of § 2(b), which restricted the extent of state boundaries for purposes of the act to 
not more than three miles from the coast, was a specific limitation on the historic 
boundaries of the states. Without that limitation on the grant, the Court's analysis 
would necessarily have been directed toward the historic nature of state claims over 
inland waters and, more specifically, the maximum extent of inland waters which 
had been expressly or impliedly approved for the states when Congress admitted 
them to the Union. See 381 U.S. at 150-60. 
124. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). 
125. Constitution of 1849, art. XII. 
126. Act of July 7, 1958, 72 Stat. 339. 
127. See acts of admission of Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi cited note 21 
supra. 
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The problem of interpretation, therefore, is not alleviated by 
the existence of a stated maritime boundary. Delineation of inland 
waters is no less complex a task in that context than is a derivation 
of the term from general principles which recognize that a state 
with no defined maritime boundary has "inherent sovereignty" over 
inland waters, the seaward limit of which, together with the low. 
water mark on the shore, comprises its coast. In both cases an analysis 
must be made of the manner in which inland waters were defined 
at the time the state entered the Union, for it is reasonable to assume 
fropi analogous situations that the boundary was determined as of 
that date.128 In this regard, the problem is strikingly similar to the 
one faced by the Court in the second California case. Some basis for 
interpretation must be utilized, and the selection of any particular 
source is at least as difficult as the situation which confronted the 
Court. 
If international law is utilized as a means of delineating the 
coast of a particular state, the difficulties inherent in the absence of 
clear standards of measurement are obvious. Courts would be faced 
with vague tests involving economic and geographic factors peculiar 
to the subject state, and ascertainment of the boundary would be a 
purely subjective matter, not subject to any predictable certainty. 
In addition, severe inequities could be created among the states. 
Our developing technology implies that the later the state is ad-
mitted, the greater will be the nexus which exists between the land 
and adjoining maritime areas, since the technology makes that nexus 
possible. Since such a relationship is at the heart of the decision in 
the Fisheries Case, states which joined the Union recently would be 
able to claim much greater areas of inland waters than would the 
states admitted earlier. 
An alternative means of determining inland waters as of the 
date of admission of a state is to look not to general principles of 
international law, but rather to the United States' application of 
those principles. However, there are three difficulties involved in 
this approach. First, it assumes that the executive branch had a 
clearly defined policy on inland waters at the time the various coastal 
states were admitted. Yet, in the pre-1912 period, when the vast 
majority of states were admitted, and certainly prior to 1888, when 
the ten-mile rule for bays was first proposed, the United States' posi-
tion on inland waters was somewhat confused. 
128. On admission to the Union, each state receives title to land underlying 
"navigable" waters within its boundaries. See Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 
243, 260 (1913); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1894). "Navigability" is deter-
mined as of the date of admission. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931). 
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A second objection to utilization of the policy of the executive 
branch to define inland waters for a state lies in the fact that such 
a procedure would be unrelated to the basis for which the policy was 
initially formulated. The executive branch, vested with full author-
ity over foreign affairs, has the power to limit state authority within 
established boundaries. However, effectuation of sound foreign 
policy does not require that the boundaries be set at the limiting 
point. Indeed, there is no rational foundation for using standards 
adopted for purposes of foreign policy to define state boundaries 
when the boundary, in and of itself, does not affect that policy. 
The third objection to defining state inland-water boundaries 
through reference to Executive policy is one of practicality. This 
method of definition would create serious inequities between the 
states which, although perhaps constitutionally permissible, would 
be logically indefensible. The policy of the executive branch on 
inland waters is dictated by the exigencies of foreign affairs, which 
may change from day to day. Thus, if the states' inland water bound-
aries had been fixed by the policy of the executive branch at the 
time they entered the Union, many states would have a six-mile 
closing line for bays, and those admitted after 1888 would have a 
ten-mile closing line. Similarly, because of the change in Executive 
policy in 1961,129 any states admitted to the Union after that date 
would have a 24-mile closing line for bays, and if in the future 
the State Department modified its policy to adopt straight baselines, 
new states would come in with inland-water boundaries completely 
unrelated to those of previous states. As a practical matter, it would 
seem far better to utilize some system of boundary definition which 
produces. uniform inland-water boundaries throughout all the 
coastal states rather than make the issue tum on the day-to-day 
problems of foreign affairs. 
As suggested by California's argument in reference to the Sub-
merged Lands Act,13° there is conceivably a third framework within 
which to determine the extent of a state's inland waters on the date 
of its admission into the Union. It is arguable that in passing Dthe 
act Congress impliedly recognized as valid the states' beliefs as to 
the location of their boundaries insofar as inland waters are con-
cerned; however, the Supreme Court's analysis in California to the 
effect that such a limitation would prove to be "none at all"181 
129. See note 82 supra and accompanying text. 
130. See text accompanying note 105 supra. 
131. See ibid. 
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applies with equal effect in this context. In addition, the argument 
can apply equally well in reverse. It is just as easy to assume that 
when a state enters the Union without a geographically described 
inland-water boundary, by implication it accepts the congressional 
understanding of where that boundary lies. Indeed, if a selection 
must be made between these two alternatives, the latter would 
appear to be the better, since it is consistent with the established 
doctrine that Congress alone has the authority to set state boundaries. 
Delineation of the inland-water boundaries of the states, there-
fore, will present the same difficulties which accompanied the defi-
nition of inland waters for the purpose of the Submerged Lands Act. 
There is no reason to assume that the courts will adopt any different 
philosophy than has been exhibited by the Supreme Court in the 
related context of the California case. If the Supreme Court was 
·willing to assume that Congress left to the courts the "selection" 
of a standard for definition of inland waters in the Submerged Lands 
Act, is there any reason to assume that the same analysis will not be 
utilized for interpreting congressional acts defining state boundaries? 
Certainly the practical reasons for selecting the Geneva Conven-
tion as a basis for defining inland waters under the Submerged Lands 
Act were no more pressing than those attending the need t<;> delin-
eate the inland-water boundaries of the states. First, the Geneva 
Convention supplies the sort of objective standards of measurement 
which are desirable in ascertaining the extent of a boundary. Second, 
the standards in the Convention are reasonable, and represent an 
international consenS\lS as well as the policy of our own national 
government. Third, selection of the same standard of measurement 
utilized in the Submerged Lands Act avoids the possible anomaly 
noted earlier132 that a few states might otherwise receive vast areas 
of submerged lands which would have been denied to sister states 
similarly located. 
Of course, a standard of definition for• inland-water boundaries 
adopted years after any state entered the Union raises obvious logical 
problems. These problems, however, are no greater than those which 
confronted the Court in the California case, and, while not neces-
sarily susceptible of easy refutation, should prove equally simple to 
avoid. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There are, of course, certain remaining problems of boundary 
delineation. Outstanding among these is the determination of a basis 
132. See text accompanyin.g note 124 supra. 
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for defining "historic waters" within the boundaries of the states. 
First, the standards by which claims to historic waters will be mea-
sured must be established, a matter which could possibly be resolved 
by reference to the requirement of the Geneva Convention that there 
have been an exercise of continuous and exclusive authority. Second, 
assuming established standards, a determination will be required 
as to which authority, state or federal, must assert the necessary 
claim. Judging from the Supreme· Court's analysis of the propriety 
of California's straight-baseline method, it is reasonable to assume 
that a state's exercise of jurisdiction will be deemed insufficient. 
These tentative conclusions, however, suggest the most difficult 
problem .. Assuming that a state claims that federal authority has 
been extended to certain waters, -What significance will be placed 
on a specific present disclaimer by the executive branch of either 
past or present jurisdiction over the area? 
The continued existence of difficult problems does not detract 
from the fact that the basic rules of boundary delineation are now 
either established or reasonably predictable. Commencing with the 
first California case, and culminating with the second, the Supreme 
Court has created a framework for orderly division of maritime 
jurisdiction between state and federal authorities. Those rules repre• 
sent a major step in bringing order from chaos in this field of the 
law. · 
